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LANGUAGE AND THE 
DOMINANCE OF MODALITY 
HORST RUTHROF 
MODALITY AND THEORIZING 
THE  QUESTION WHETHER  THE  LANGUAGE of everyday life is  primarily  a referential 
system of notion or a highly modal, intersubjective activity of persuasion and 
fluid-meaning negotiation is an old one. Aristotle largely favors the former, Plato 
does clearly the latter. Where Aristotle's mimetic conception places the emphasis 
on language as a system for the imitation of action, Plato's distinction between 
logical and emotive language leads him to expel the poet from his ideal state as 
a liar. He quite rightly suspects that poets cannot be expected to observe modal 
abstinence but will, if they are worth their salt, make full use of their seductive 
charm.
1  And even philosophical  speech,  such  as  Socrates', is  ultimately not 
condemned by a large and democratic jury for the well-known proposition of 
impiety and the perversion of young minds, but rather for reasons of rhetoric: 
his  arrogance,  contempt,  and insults. 
2  It is  the main purpose of this paper to 
demonstrate the need for a comprehensive theory of covert modality. 
Broadly speaking, both the history of language philosophy since Frege and 
more recent developments in linguistics exhibit a preference for strict referentiality 
and  propositional  meaning  as  sense.  Nor  does  the  notion of "counterfactual 
states" or "the ways the dice did not fall" of possible-world semantics hold much 
promise for the study of those intricate modal shifts as occur in socially saturated 
speech and predominate in literary discourse (Kripke, 44,48). And even modal 
semantics has tended to restrict itself to  such modalities as  alethic (necessity, 
possibility, contingency), deontic (obligation, permissibility), epistemic (knowl-
edge, certainty, ignorance),  and doxastic markers (belief, opinion, conjecture) 
(Camap  1958,  1943;  Wittgenstein:  propositions  4464  and  515-5156).  Some 
philosophers,  notably  Quine  and  Russell,  have  gone  as  far  as  to  query  the 
necessity  and  possibility of modal  logic  altogether  (Rescher,  85-96;  cf.  also 
Poser).  The predilection for laboratory expressions such as  "The present King 
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of the inability of this kind of language philosophy to  come to  grips with what 
actually goes on in ordinary language, let alone in the language of literature. 
One might object at this point that it was precisely for these reasons that 
John L. Austin introduced to  analytical and atomistic thinking about language 
the  triadic expansion of the propositional "core" to  illocutionary,  locutionary, 
and perlocutionary acts  (Austin).  But without in any way underestimating the 
revolutionary impact of Austin's approach, Austin never claimed, as I think he 
should have, that modality, or illocution and perlocution in interaction, should 
be  understood  as  essential parts  of meaning.  Sadly,  in  his  theory illocutions 
remain a force outside propositions, a view that has been ossified in the lucidly 
mechanistic version of speech-act theory as presented by John R. Searle (Searle 
1969,  1975,  1976a,  1976b).  But one  could take the  very  different  stance  of 
saying that meanings as they occur are always already modalized, especially in 
the  writings  of language philosophy.  Another modal  blind spot of speech-act 
theory is that it takes for granted, certainly in Austin's and Searle's work, such 
notions as  the "speaker" and the "hearer," as  if they were reliable constants in 
the economy of meanings.  Such fictions are indispensable if we wish to throw 
light on specific conceptualizations of language, but it should not have come as 
a surprise that the recalcitrance of their presence in speech-act theory was soon 
to meet a parodic challenge (Derrida 1977). 
With  few  exceptions,  literary linguistics has  shared with philosophy this 
reluctance to deal with modality in a broad sense, as illustrated by the structuralist 
study  of narrative from  Propp to  Todorov that has  added considerably  to  the 
propositional-referential bias  (Propp  1975,  1971).
3  Indeed,  the  dominance  of 
theories-of-action  sequence  masquerading as  grammars  of narrative has  for  a 
long time been the expression of the absence of a comprehensive modal narrative 
theory (cf. Prince 1973; less so  1982). Recently, Jacques Derrida, in one sense 
a more radical Austin,  has ruptured this kind of thinking with his revival of a 
Heideggerian  approach  to  language and its  transformation into deconstructive 
practice (Derrida 1973b).
4 
In  everyday discourse,  much of the speaker's overall modality is  derived 
intersubjectively  (that is,  by  mutual  interpretation and meaning negotiation), 
largely from the semiological, nonlinguistic communicative dynamics of  posture, 
dress, or facial expression. By contrast, a great deal ofthe modal forces operating 
in the reading of written material are constructed as a response to the text within 
the  context of a  wide  variety  of conditions  that precede  and  accompany  the 
reading/utterance situation. It is  to the reading of texts, therefore, and complex 
rather than "simple" ones,  that we  must ultimately look for fruitful  questions 
concerning modality. But first a few comments on the difference between discur-
sive and formal signification. 
Everyday  speech  exchange is  part of what Jurgen Habermas  once called 
the discourse of "symbolic interaction" (Habermas 1971: 81-122, esp 92 ff.; cf. 
also  1979 and 1987). His fundamental distinction between symbolic interaction 
and  the  realm  of "purposive-rational action"  with its  "context-free" technical 
language, though revised later into triadic models, is still useful to a discussion 
of the  special problem of modality in that it allows  us  to point out what one ...__ 
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might call the referential fallacy in the study of cultural production. Habermas 
quite rightly sees that our performances of activities in each sphere differ pro-
foundly.  In operating in the sphere of symbolic interaction, we take for granted 
social reciprocity without ever being certain that this assumption will be fulfilled. 
In other words, linguistic and semiotic signification in symbolic interaction may 
look like technical signs but are not really such signs at all. The sphere of wholly 
purposive rational action, on the other hand,  is  characterized by predictability 
and cause-and-effect relationships, switch-on-switch-off mechanisms, and "tog-
gle logic." Its discourse therefore is one in which the exchange of messages can 
be  rightly  based  on  the  assumption  of the  identity  of the  sent  and  received 
message.  But how is  meaning identity possible? It is  possible in signification, 
which is ruled by definitions proper (that is, formally empty sign systems). And 
the difference between social discourse and such artificial languages lies in the 
triple neutralization operative in formal relations: the neutralization of reference, 
the neutralization of deixis, and the neutralization of the sociohistorical frame. 
In so  far as  technical discourse is  "cognitive," in Habermas's sense,  it too is 
characterized by the neutralization of its context. Technical discourse is thus the 
process of reconstructed and repeatable meaning, while cultural discourse is the 
process  of constructed and shifting meaning,  or meaning approximation.  The 
differential between the two is  implied modality. 
Without a general theory of implied modality capable of giving a systematic 
account of this difference, the discussion of culture, language, and in particular 
literary language remains threatened by the appropriating bids from the realm 
of  technical, purposive-rational action. Much oflanguage philosophy and linguis-
tic  structuralism,  in using the  concept of the  signified as  a Saussurean given, 
shares  with  technical  discourse  the  assumption  of the  possibility of identical 
meaning reconstruction.  But this assumption must prove fatal when applied to 
culturally saturated social speech and especially literary discourse for the very 
reason that they explore modality more fully  than do  other kinds of discourse. 
Indeed, it makes sense to regard the discursive formations of any literature, past 
and present, as the most advanced linguistic experiments in the language laboratory 
of living speech.  The reversal of propositional meaning in the construction of 
ironic modality, for instance, is only one extreme possibility of modification on 
a spectrum of  vast complexity, a complexity that merits closer scrutiny.  5 Between 
the reversal of propositional meaning implied by ironic modality and its straight 
reading-a case  that  does  not exist-must be  entailed  an  infinite number of 
meaning variations on one and the same proposition. Such a hypothetical scale 
would allow the allocation of specific readings of propositions and texts. But it 
would also have to be vindicated by an argument about the basis on which those 
readings are chosen in favor of  alternative readings, a basis that only a comprehen-
sive theory of covert modality could supply.  It is  in this  sense then that I am 
defining modality as the structurable field of  the manners of  speaking underlying 
all utterances, afield made up of  events of  filling the "vacant subject positions" 
of  discourse (Foucault, passim). 
Even when we are confronted face to face by speakers in everyday speech 
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what  we  consider  to  be fitting  "subject positions"  and  respond  accordingly, 
modifying them as the social dynamics of our needs, desires, and compulsions 
dictates.  When we  face  a written text,  the  inferential nature  of these  modal 
constructions is foregrounded. Not only is the materiality of the prosodic contour 
absent, but also are all those other cues that are embedded in the multiple semiotic 
frame of actual speech situation and act as  an interpretive schema. Alone with 
the  text,  we  fill  not only our own but also  imaginatively a number of other 
subject positions. And to the degree to which we do so are we active makers of 
meanings or victims of only partly realized texts. 
But so far the structurable field of manners of speaking has remained highly 
abstract.  How  do  those  events  of concretizing  subject  positions  constitute  a 
network,  and what is  the inner horizonality of such events? In principle,  one 
could  say  that if,  as  I assume,  propositional and modal realizations  are both 
unstable signifieds (rather than the one acting as  signifier for the other as  sig-
nified),  then both signified domains are  structurable according to  the kind of 
sociopolitical mastergrid by means of which we may wish to conceptualize the 
social life-world. One such scenario could looklike Table 1. 
When we come to  considering the literary text (as  well as  to reading the 
nonliterary text in a literary manner), our modal constructions need to be sensitive 
also particularly to intertextuality, or the way a text can be related to other texts. 
I am not suggesting, however, that the literary is a subset of workaday discourse. 
This is the broad assumption of the majority of linguistic approaches to literary 
language.  I  am  taking the  quite  different view that literary language is  not a 
subcategory of ordinary language, but its ludic alternative.  Or, if one were to 
take a Heideggerian view, one could press the point further by suggesting that 
literary language is actual language, all others being reductive variants. Certainly 
the linguistic notion of langue as  general linguistic rule-system is derived from 
one set of languages, namely everyday language; it is "merely" an  abstraction 
from  one  set of language games  and cannot therefore be  transferred to  apply 
automatically to  quite  another set,  that of literary language,
6  especially if we 
remember that one of the base rules of literature is that it continuously breaks 
and so rewrites all possible linguistic rules.  This division is only an  analytical 
one,  for in pragmatics the ludic variants of everyday speech are part of social 
discourse, just as  the latter's typical discursive formations reappear within the 
frames  of the literary.  And just as  the aesthetic stance (or "aesthetic object" in 
Ingarden,  "aesthetic function"  in Mukafovsky)  (Ingarden  1973a,  1973b,  esp. 
175ff.;  Mukai'ovsky  1970)  is  not  a  substance  of pragmatic functions,  so  too 
should the performance of literature not be seen as merely a subordinate category 
of everyday life.  Rather, the pragmatic and the aesthetic are discourses within 
the  larger system of general semiosis:  literature is  the ludic alternative to  the 
discourse of everyday life. This is why literary language can look both indistin-
guishable and totally different from workaday speech. 
Whenever we read a narrative text in an aesthetic manner (the literary text 
being  the  kind  of text  that  encourages  such  a  manner  of reading  by  special 
markers),  we not only tend to place emphasis on the oscillation between what 
is  said and how it is  said, between the so-called content of the proposition and TABLE 1.  SIGNlFIEDS (DOUBLING UP AS  SECONDARY SIGNlFIERS AND  SO ON) 
Social  Ideological 
Domains  Time  Space  Actants  Events/  Acts  positions  Values  motivation 
Proposi- Tempo- Spatial  Agents of  Event  Actants'  Actants'  Actants' 
tional  ralgridof  coordi- discursive  structure  positions  philo- ideological 
discursive  nates of  reality  and actants'  in social  sop  hi  cal,  commit-
reality  discursive  doings  reality  political,  ments 
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its  modalities,  or the  way  and  by whom it is  expressed,  but also  put greater 
weight on the modal side of the equation. In this asymmetrical dialectic, every 
item of the reader's construction can function as  a modal qualifier of any other 
item. 
It is on the grounds of this fundamental asymmetry that literary theory must 
take itself seriously enough to see its own field of inquiry as its legitimate starting 
point:  the  modally  weighted reading of the literary text,  that is,  any  kind of 
literary reading, without at this stage attaching any value to particular choices. 
The strength, for example, of Derrida's deconstructive approach is not so much 
philosophical-although his theory of meaning instability is substantial-as it is 
literary.  For he reads the philosophical text as if it were literary, uncovering as 
he does its concealed metaphors, its unacknowledged rhetoric and hidden speech 
acts,  in short,  its  covert modalities.  In so  undermining the  natural attitude of 
reading,  Derrida,  notwithstanding his  critique of the  early  Husser!,  is  a  true 
phenomenologist, albeit a playfully noetical one. 
To  take  the  act of reading  as  its  point of departure  is  a natural for  the 
phenomenological method, since in phenomenology the grasping of an object is 
in reality a description of the acts of consciousness we perform when we realize 
a  phenomenon.  And  contra  the  subjectivist  charge  often  leveled  against 
phenomenology,  such  acts  are  always  performed  intersubjectively-that  is, 
against the background of communicative competence according to which any 
individual act is embedded in and informed by the social life-world of a semiotic 
community. 
8 No matter how experienced a reader I am, my total typified knowl-
edge,  everyday as  well  as  intertextual,  comes into play in  the act of reading. 
And part of this competence is the ability to perform a wide range of overt and, 
more important, covert modal operations (cf.  Habermas 1970a).
9 
Any aspect of a literary text, its embeddedness in intertextuality and a vast 
number of other phenomena (as for example current ideological stances, writing 
and reading trends, production, or the dominant "syllabus") are potential clues 
as to a work's constructable manner of speaking. Consequently, the same range 
of items also acts as a set of potential signposts for our manner of reading. This 
manner of reading is the evocation of literary meanings by constructing a work's 
propositional content as  always already and multiply modalized. 
As  I have tried  to  show elsewhere,  every  narrative  guides  the reader to 
construct  a  dynamic  and  dialectically linked double  vision  of spatiotemporal 
aspects, aspects of acts and events, personae, and philosophical and ideological 
features on the side of the narrative speech act and the side of the quasi-referential 
"presented world" (Ruthrof 1981).  In this process of the reader's construction 
of narrative,  all  linguistic  features,  concepts,  mental  images,  or ideological 
aspects, as well as the total aesthetic object that accrues to shimmer unstably as 
a retrospective view  at  the end of any reading,  act as  modal forces.  They are 
not only concretized as such or held in readiness for the reader's concretizations, 
but also modify one another and so introduce a degree of  fluidity which forcefully 
contradicts propositional stability. 
As  a consequence of this emphasis on the reader's construction of speech 
attitudes underlying the propositions of a literary text as well as the whole text, _..,J,_ 
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I  am bound to juxtapose to the conception of a relatively stable propositional 
form of reading of artistic narrative the notion of a highly unstable modal alter-
native. But instead of venturing from the platform of overt modality to the less 
well-known regions of implied modality as  modal logic has tended to proceed, 
I prefer the dive into the deep water of covert modality as a problematic that is 
involved in all reading. This leaves me with the unenviable and perhaps unman-
ageable task of  indicating how at least part of  this problematic could be understood 
as  a function of literary reading. 
MODALITY AND NARRATIVE 
We can begin to  describe modality by distinguishing between the modal 
force of the reader's overall stance that he/  she brings to bear on the act of  reading, 
the overtly given and the inferrable modalities within the text, and the inferred 
authorial attitude as  an abstraction from the text. Since every writer and reader 
is  inextricably interwoven into the web of a social life-world, the construction 
of meaning must include the authorial stance as  an object of conjecture and the 
reader's own commitment as  an object of self-reflexive analysis.
10 Because a 
novel's manner of speaking is primarily realized as  a manner of reading,  the 
reader's participation in  a specific historical  "Aesthetic Ideology"  (in literary 
competence, etc.) as  part of a "General Ideology" as well as  his realization of 
the  "Literary Mode  of Production"  involved as  part of a "General Mode  of 
Production" have a bearing on his constructions (Eagleton, 44-63). Accordingly, 
any specific reading may be regarded as more or less relevant if measured against 
the dominant ideology of a given historical moment.  Individual readings may 
of course transcend what appears to be the dominant code and so  violate and 
restructure  the  canon  of interpretations.  But whatever  the  ruling  horizon  of 
reading expectations, it is at the level of the manner of reading as an active force 
in the construction of narrative meaning that non-literary theories must be har-
nessed for a more comprehensive grasp of the extraneous modal forces co-deter-
mining the text. 
From this perspective, one function of the text can be seen to be a complex 
concealment of multiple modalities: the text as hermeneutic challenge. From the 
same angle,  the function of reading and criticism is the positing of modalities, 
and the function of narrative theory is the systematic exploration of all aspects 
of that  complexity.  I am  arguing  therefore  also  that, for instance,  Halliday's 
concept of register as "the clustering of semantic features according to situation 
types" or discourse that is dependent on the type of situation cannot act as  an 
umbrella subsuming  all  other features  of the  text. 
11  In everyday  speech,  and 
more complexly in literary narrative, register is a discourse chosen for a purpose. 
It is for this directionality, which selects discourse and therefore has logical as 
well as temporal priority over discourse, that I wish to reserve the term modality. 
In the following I select a few instances of such modal directionality. 
The registers or discourse genres that Joyce employs in "The Oxen of the 
Sun" scene of Ulysses are not in themselves a direct indication of their apparent 
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more  broadly by the  reader in relation with his/her construction of an  overall 
implied authorial  stance:  an  intertextual conception of the  world in which art 
gives meaning to  sociopolitical reality (Joyce, 380-425). 
Looking along the forward reading dimension, modality can be manifest or 
latent.  But overt modal markers usually pose no  great problems to reading.  It 
is  when there are no  modal markers present in a passage that the reader's task 
becomes demanding and also the more interesting. Not only could we say that 
every word along the  syntagmatic  axis  is  potentially qualified by every other 
word, but also that absences, negations, and other paradigmatic alternatives fulfill 
modal functions (cf.  Iser, 182-225).
12 
Another aspect of modality comes into view if we focus  on reading as  a 
stratified activity Y  The strata of print/sound, linguistic formations, aspects and 
objectivities,  and inferred work ideology act as  modal forces both in terms of 
their  function  as  logical steps  for further  operations  (we  cannot derive  work 
ideology before having performed linguistic operations) and in terms of the role 
they play in the overall "polyphony of aesthetic value qualities" (Ingarden 1973a) 
that the reader may attach to any feature of  any stratum as well as to the interaction 
of the strata in the reading consciousness.
14 But modality plays a role not only 
in the realization of single items along the syntagmatic extension and stratification 
of the text, but also in macrostructural operations.
15 
When we decide, for example, what kind of narrative nexus a story displays 
(additive, causal, symbolic correlation, metafictional self-reflexivity, or narrative 
disruption), we are making at the same time a modal inference about the author 
as  an engineer of stories. The exclusion of the ethical dimension in Poe's "The 
Murders in the Rue Morgue," in favor of foregrounding the mechanics of action 
and  causality  may  lead  us  to  characterize  the  story  as  teleological  narration 
revealing an epistemic and alethic modal interest on the part of the author.  By 
comparison, Dostoevsky's "The Landlady" ("Chozyayka") with its possible mul-
tiple solutions defines its reading as speculation and the story as guessing game 
(Gerigk,  73ff.).  Its  underlying authorial stance could be described broadly as 
doxastic. Such modal inferences at the level of macrostructure and architectonic 
dynamics have a direct bearing on overall thematic inferences and work ideology. 
We are now asking: What is the story saying? 
From the perspective of the retrospective view, another aspect of modality 
has to be acknowledged.  Our step-by-step reading is transformed, more or less 
radically, by our overall concretization which, in tum, is modified by our correc-
tions, and so on. 16 This process of continuous requalification is furthered by the 
fact that the reader, between different readings,  does not merely change as  a 
result of influences outside the text but, as  does the viewer of Apollo's torso in 
Rilke's poem, is changed by what he/she has constructed from the text (Rilke, 
115)Y And  although Rilke  has  a more  essentialist view  of the  subject than 
Foucault,  he  does  suggest  here  the  possibility  of different  subject  positions 
vis-a-vis a text taken by one and the same individual reader. 
Fundamental to the construction of narrative meaning is also the realization 
of the following triple modality of  utterance. As we attend to the surface narrative, 
we  conceptualize the  activities of three interrelated but distinct modal forces: ----......_ 
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the modality of  the presented personae, that of  the narrator(s) ornarrative voice(s), 
and that of the inferred author.  Our construction of the first two  allows us to 
conjure up the latter, while at the same time that last construction, once achieved, 
may  radically modify our assumptions about  th~ previous modalities. Further, 
each presented speech act, as distinguished from presentational speech acts, has 
its own modality, revealing aspects of  the quasi-physical as well as moral-political 
stance  of the  speaker.  Presented  speech  acts  also  function  as  a modal force 
qualifying other presented speech acts  as  well as  those of the narrator.  In the 
case of realized, unreliable narration,  the reader's judgments clash with those 
of the narrator, with the result that the latter tend to be read as inauthentic. From 
the resulting tension between the given signifiers and our substitutions emerges 
a set of inferences  about the  overall authorial  stance,  which in tum acts as  a 
modal cue for our reading of the text as  a whole. 
A case in point is the reader's construction of the complex presentational 
process in "The Wandering Rocks" episode in Ulysses,  which acts  itself as  a 
signifier for a more abstract signified:  a set of authorial modal characteristics. 
The spatially dynamic  and temporally static first part of the episode is linked 
with the spatiotemporal linearity of the second part by the matching images of 
the  cross-section through blood vessels  as  against the organic flow  of blood 
through a vein (Joyce, 281-354). If  we  take all this (techniques and images) as 
a quasi-referential statement, we are inclined to construct a corresponding autho-
rial manner of speaking: an interest in the technical as well as symbolic exploration 
of narrative art as well as  a view about active analytical and passive polythetic 
typical acts of consciousness. Such modal inferences in tum result in a reviewing 
of the nature and possible function of presentational-technique-as-statement. 
The  construction of the  inferred  author  is  postponed when  a number of 
speakers compete with one another for narrative authority. In the case of  Chaucer's 
Canterbury Tales,  this competition adds significantly to the work's deictic com-
plexity, its speech acts ranging from pornography to anti-Semitism to sanctimoni-
ous  piety. 
18  And  since  all  critical  attempts  have  failed  to  show  any  special 
possible affinity between any one narrator or group of narrators, we are left to 
assume that Chaucer's ultimate stance is aesthetic-moral rather than moral-aesthet-
ic,  and that he prefers to  show his  medieval world as  colourful theatre rather 
than as  an admirable or a despicable world. Here modality and theatricality are 
structurally linked.  In the performed dramatic text,  this nexus often results in 
the modal evasiveness of the authorial statement. 
One of the directly authorial propositions in any narrative is its title, although 
the authorial modal inferences it may suggest vary considerably and stand in a 
reciprocally  qualifying relationship with all  other aspects of our construction. 
There is  little we  can derive from the title Emma,  except that it is realized as 
the subject of a long and compound predication about Emma, a little more from 
Pride  and Prejudice,  and  a  good  deal  more  from  intertextual  titles  such  as 
Ulysses,  Dr. Faustus,  The Sound and the Fury,  and Eyeless in Gaza. Huxley's 
title, for instance, refers to the beginning of  SamsonAgonistes in which the lines 
Promise was that I 
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Ask for this great deliverer now, and find him 
Eyeless in Gaza at the mill with slaves, 
Himself in bonds under Philistian yoke 
act  as  a  structural  question  and  promise answered  and  fulfilled  by  Samson's 
self-sacrifice at the end of Milton's dramatic poem (Milton, 250, lines 38-42). 
In tum, Huxley's elliptical quotation constitutes a tentative modal interpretative 
guide  to  our construction  of Anthony's and  Helen's initial  sense  of spiritual 
emptiness as contrasted with their social and personal commitment at the end of 
the novel. 
The above catalog of modal transformations is meant neither to be complete 
nor to  act as  a new form of narrative closure; it is designed as  an indication of 
the need to structure a problematic field.  For without an emphasis on covert or 
inferential modality, our theorizing about literary texts is incapable of escaping 
the limitations of the propositional-referential bias. Nor will deconstructive free-
play remain  a satisfactory response in the  long term.  What is  needed beyond 
Derrida's demonstration of rhetorical force is a combination of theoretical ap-
proaches that allow us to communicate about the reasons for the instability and 




1.  Argued by Plato at various places,  as  for instance in the Republic,  Books II, III,  and  X, 
Apology, Phaedrus,  and Ion. 
2.  According to  the Apology, the jury consisted of 501  members. 
3.  Although Todorov is aware of part of the modal side of narrative in The Poetics of Prose 
(e.g. 25ff.), he  still reveals a strong "propositional" bias. 
4.  In reading Derrida's "Differance" one should not forget the  author's considerable debt to 
Heidegger's paper "Language" and his discussion of"ontic-ontological difference" in Being and  Time. 
5. I am  not aware of the existence of such a theory. 
6. However, I wish to retain the distinction between langue and parole in the senses of stipulatable 
rule structure and actual speech, respectively, whereby langue always has logical, though no temporal, 
priority over parole. 
7.  The fact that literary language can look like everyday language (without functioning as such) 
and unlike everyday speech declares the search for essential properties ofliterary language a misguided 
enterprise. 
8. "Intersubjectivity" is understood here in the sense in which Alfred Schutz continued Husserl's 
research on the subject. The extension of this notion along lines of social philosophy and communi-
cation owes  much  to  Habermas's concept  of "communicative  competence"  (1970)  which  is  not 
identical with Dell H. Hymes's socio-linguistic usage of the term. 
9.  Habermas's study of "distorted communication" explores, among other things,  modality as 
manipulation. 
10.  This  follows  from  a model  according  to  which  the  actual  author and  the  actual reader 
communicate with one another "through their implied counterparts" (Chatman,  31). My objection 
to  Chatman's study is that its exploration of the modal side of narrative still reflects the structural 
bias toward the propositional and so remains restrictive. There is strictly no logical reason why the -----
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modal side of narrative (discourse), especially in its covert forms, should receive less space than its 
celebrated propositional counterpart (story). 
11.  As  a "selection of meanings that constitutes the variety to which a text belongs," register 
still requires a further point of orientation in the life world from which the chosen register makes 
sense (Halliday,  111). 
12.  Iser's discussion  of "blanks," "negations," and  "negativity"  in Iser 1979:  182-225  is  a 
development of  Ingarden' s notion of  "concretization," which in tum is a special case of the Husserlian 
"appresentation." 
13. For a detailed discussion of stratification from the perspective of the reader's construction 
of narrative meaning see Ruthrof 1981: 51ff. 
14. I am disregarding the objectivist notion of  such a polyphony being a property of  the text itself. 
15. Note that the pair syntagmatic axis/stratification is not coterminous with syntagmatic/para-
digmatic. 
16. I have applied the noesis/noema distinction to the cumulative construction of meaning along 
the forward reading dimension in both lyrical poetry and narrative; cf.  e.g. Ruthrof 1974,  1975. 
17. A fruitful interpretive link is established between Rilke' s poem and Malcolm Lowry's Under 
the Volcano by William H.  Gass, 76. 
18.  Cf., e.g., "The Reves Tale" and "The Prioresses Tale." 
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